Introduction
The United States largely relies on a system of arbitration to handle retail consumer financial disputes. This approach has undergone significant challenge in recent years particularly in light of recent abuses of consumer credit arbitration mechanisms. The global reach of the financial crisis calls for renewed investigation of how governments and self-regulatory organisations in major financial centres can effectively employ responsive dispute resolution mechanisms to address citizen complaints arising from financial dislocation. Such an examination is important not only to help us understand the dynamics of resolving complex consumer disputes in times of financial crisis, but also to prepare us to apply lessons learned to the design of more robust, fair and efficient centres for the prevention and resolution of future financial disputes.
Survey
In order to assess how arbitrators and ombudsmen view the benefits, challenges and suggestions for the improvement of both ombuds and arbitration processes, a survey was conducted between the Fall of 2011 and the Summer of 2012.
Nearly a hundred survey questionnaires were distributed to practitioners throughout the world. A total of forty-eight arbitrators and ombuds people from East Asia, North America, Europe, the Middle East and Africa responded. The participants represented highly experienced practitioners, members of government regulatory ombuds services and private arbitration commissions. The majority of those surveyed (44 per cent) had worked for institutions involved in consumer financial dispute resolution for more than four years.
Survey Design
The survey used in this study contained a quantitative part asking for yes-no answers and numerical responses in the form of percentage estimates or evaluations according to four and five-point scales.
The summary of the findings are as follows: practitioners of consumer financial dispute resolution view ombuds processes as particularly useful in providing an independent and free review service for financial customers. At the same time the service also helps to identify areas of improvement and reform for banks. 1 Perhaps as a result of such benefits, the use of ombuds processes has been increasing in recent years. The majority of respondents (89 per cent) indicated that they had in fact seen an increase in the use of ombuds processes in consumer financial dispute resolution in recent years. At the same time, practitioners acknowledged areas for continued improvement including the need for greater public education, 2 oversight and quality assurance of ombuds processes. 3 The summary of the findings in relation to the arbitration process are as follows: Arbitration practitioners viewed the benefits of arbitration services in consumer financial disputes as providing disputants with technical expertise 'where the parties are not arguing over the law, but application of financial/accounting principles.' 4 In addition, respondents noted the 'speed, reduced expense and expertise of the neutral.' Among the challenges include 'proof issues, imbalance of power and information and lack of full discovery options/rights'. 5 Concerns about such disparities were echoed by other participants who noted the prevalence of perceptions that 'large institutions have "repeat-user" advantage'. 6 Practitioners noted suggestions for improvement including the need for '[g]ood program design
[including] exit evaluations [and a] grievance process to allow parties to file complaints against neutrals who do not perform well'. In addition, 'a code of ethics for neutrals' was suggested along with 'anything that supports procedural due process'. 
Background -Financial Dispute Resolution in the United States
In the United States, several major programs exist for the resolution of consumer financial disputes. 8 These include both private arbitration and courtannexed programs for credit card and bank loan complaints. Among the most prominent nationwide programs in the area of investment disputes is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ('FINRA'). What characterises most consumer dispute resolution programs in the United States is a common concern for efficiency and finality. However, such goals are increasingly being examined in the larger context of principles of equity and transparency as limited opportunities exist for court oversight and no general right of appeal exists on the part of the complainant to pursue claims in court (as in the ombuds model) if the complainant is not satisfied with the final award.
The American Arbitration Association
Among the more prominent alternative financial dispute resolution scheme, the American Arbitration Association ('AAA') provides a special set of rules for financial disputes: the AAA Arbitration Rules for Commercial Financial Disputes, which are applicable to all disputes relating to commercial financial arrangements, products, or other matters, or conduct relating thereto 9 . This would including credit card and bank loan disputes. To meet the financial sector's interest in speedy proceedings, the Rules provide a limited period for arbitration proceedings with a maximum time frame of 120 days 10 . For disputes where only a small amount of money is involved (up to US$75,000), an expedited procedure applies 11 , according to which a sole arbitrator will decide the dispute, preferably after only one day of hearing. If a second hearing is necessary, the rules provide that it shall take place within seven days of the first hearing. The award has to be rendered within thirty days of the conclusion of the hearing 12 . 9 See r. 1 of the AAA Arbitration Rules for Commercial Financial Disputes: 'The parties to a dispute involving any commercial financial arrangement, product or other matter or conduct relating thereto, shall be deemed to have made these rules a part of their arbitration agreement whenever they have provided for arbitration by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or under its Commercial Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules.' 10 See r. 1, ibid:
'Consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration, the parties shall make every effort in good faith to conclude the arbitration within 120 days of its commencement.' 11 See r. 9, ibid:
'Unless the AAA in its discretion determines otherwise or the parties agree otherwise, the Expedited Procedures shall be applied in any case where no disclosed claim or counterclaim exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and arbitration costs.' 12 S. Kratsch, 'The financial crisis: arbitration as a viable option for European financial institutions', Arbitration, 76(4) 2010, pp. 680-685. For details of the expedited procedures, see rr. 51-55, ibid: '51. Notice by Telephone The parties shall accept all notices from the AAA by telephone. Such notices by the AAA shall subsequently be confirmed in writing to the parties. Should there be a failure to confirm in writing any notice hereunder, the proceeding shall nonetheless be valid if notice has, in fact, been given by telephone. 52. Appointment and Qualification of Arbitrator (a) Where no disclosed claim or counterclaim exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and arbitration costs, the AAA shall appoint a single arbitrator, from the National Roster, without submission of lists of proposed arbitrators.
(b) Where all parties request that a list of proposed arbitrators be sent, the AAA shall submit simultaneously to each party an identical list of five proposed arbitrators, drawn from the National Roster of Arbitrators, from which one arbitrator shall be appointed. Each party may strike two names from the list on a peremptory basis. The list is returnable to the AAA within seven days from the date of the AAA's mailing to the parties. If for any reason the appointment of an arbitrator cannot be made from the list, the AAA may make the appointment from among other members of the National Roster without the submission of additional lists.
(c) The parties will be given notice by telephone by the AAA of the appointment of the arbitrator, who shall be subject to disqualification for the reasons specified in Section 17. Within seven days, the parties shall notify the AAA, by telephone, of any objection to the arbitrator appointed. Any objection by a party to the arbitrator shall be confirmed in writing to the AAA with a copy to the other party or parties. 
Financial Dispute Resolution through FINRA
In order to understand the role and function of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ('FINRA'), the most prominent nationwide program for the arbitration of consumer disputes with broker-dealers and financial institutions, it is necessary to examine its legislative and regulatory background.
Arbitration of Securities Disputes -Securities Act 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 was the first major piece of federal legislation governing securities. It combined a full disclosure scheme with antifraud provisions and the end product was federal statutory requirement to file a registration statement 
Securities Exchange Act 1934
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established the Securities Exchange Commission ('SEC') to regulate and enforce securities markets. It also contained disclosure provisions for those who buy and sell securities in the secondary market rather than the company's initial offerings, and creates remedies for fraud in trading and manipulating secondary markets 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ('FINRA') on its face, is simply a consolidation of NASD and the enforcement and arbitration functions of NYSE 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was a major reform bill that includes a provision that empowers the SEC to prohibit predispute arbitration agreements in customer agreements 42 . 
Underlying Legal Mandate
The primary function of SROs is the regulation of broker-dealers, serving as intermediaries between the SEC and regulated members of the industry. A broker is 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Karmel, 'Should securities industry self-regulatory organizations be considered government agencies?'. 52 Rule 12200 provides that:
'Parties must arbitrate a dispute under the Code if:
• Arbitration under the Code is either: FINRADR is administered by FINRA, and is funded by regulatory fees from FINRA members, dispute resolution fees from users, as well as other fees from FINRA's regulatory role.
Oversight
The SEC exercises oversight authority over FINRA as the SRO for brokerdealers, which is the principal regulator 67 .
SROs set rules governing member firms in the financial industry and provide oversight, supplementing that of the SEC. 8 SROs report to the SEC, which subjects SRO rules to an approval process 68 .
The SEC provides little oversight over FINRA arbitration. Little oversight by the SEC combined with the court's grant of nearly limitless power to arbitrators makes investor protection uncertain at best 69 .
Strengths
The advantage of securities arbitration from a retail investors' perspective is that they may be able to recover damages despite the unavailability of a legal remedy, and emphasis of the FINRA arbitration forum on equity allows arbitrators to fashion a remedy for investors that may not be supported by the law 70 .
The pre-dispute arbitration agreement also provides reasonable notice, the right to retain counsel and to present evidence, a convenient geographical location for the evidentiary hearing, and the right to adequate relief. Arbitration with FINRA generally allows the claimant to have the dispute resolved in a timelier manner than litigation. Moreover, the statutes of limitations in many jurisdictions are substantially shorter than the NASD Customer Code's six-year eligibility rule -an investor claim filed in civil litigation might be more likely dismissed upon these grounds, whereas in arbitration the investor might have been awarded a substantial portion of his or her compensatory damages regardless of the statutes of limitations 71 .
FINRA Arbitration also offers finality benefits for either side when successful 72 .
Challenges

Harmonisation
Following the merger of NASD and NYSE Regulation, there has been the challenge of how the rules of the two organisations should be merged and harmonised, raising the issue of whether FINRA should continue with rules-based regulation or move to a principle-based or tier-based approach 73 .
Bank Broker-Dealers
FINRA recently proposed to adopt a modified version of NASD Rule 2350, known as the 'bank broker-dealer rule'. The proposed rule change seeks to prevent FINRA member firms that offer broker-dealer products and services through contractual 'networking arrangements' with financial institutions -both on and off the premises of those institutions -from undertaking certain business practices that might tend to confuse or harm customers of financial institutions. The proposed rule change also aims to prevent customer confusion by, inter alia, ensuring that certain disclosures are made to customers so they can understand and appreciate the distinction(s) between the products and services sold by a financial institution and those sold by its broker-dealer affiliate 74 .
The proposed rule change protects bank customers who may be solicited for the purchase of investment products and services, but only to a limited extent. It does not rectify sales practices of broker-dealers -affiliated with financial institutionswhich tend to confuse, and even mislead, financially unsophisticated investors of modest means who can least afford to be exposed to excessive risk. 75 Additionally, the proposed rule change adds no meaningful surveillance, inspection, enforcement, or punitive mechanisms to prevent and/or redress insidious practices that are akin to 'bait and switch' tactics and are particularly effective against financially unsophisticated investors. 76 In fact, the proposed rule change even rolls back some key regulatory provisions, an especially unsettling retreat when one considers the lack of oversight during the recent market malaise and the contribution that such abridgement may have made to the present economic contraction as a reverse 'wealth effect' impinges upon consumer behaviour. It is arguable that the proposed rule change is inadequate to sufficiently protect investors and promote genuine market integrity 77 .
Challenge to Mandatory Securities Arbitration
As noted above, the passage of the Arbitration Fairness Act would extend to predispute arbitration agreements in the securities industry. Furthermore, the SEC has now been empowered to prohibit such clauses in customer agreements.
Investor advocates argue securities arbitration is unfair, inefficient, expensive and biased towards the securities industry, whilst the securities industry argues the process works well, is faster and less expensive than litigation, and is fair to all parties involved 78 .
It has been argued that because securities arbitration differs from other forms of consumer arbitration, the power of the SEC should not be exercised and the Arbitration Fairness Act should not be extended to the securities industry. In this regard, it has been pointed out that the SEC robustly exercises its authority to oversee FINRA, including its dispute resolution arm, while no administrative agency reviews consumer or non-securities employment arbitration forums. FINRA Conduct Rule 3110(f) prescribes language that member firms must include in their customer agreements, and precludes brokerage firms from including unfair provisions, or 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. , which allows customers to demand broker-dealers submit to arbitration.
Optional arbitration would also reduce political pressure on FINRA to ensure the fairness of the forum. .
Non-adherence with Procedures
Many practitioners doubt the fairness of the SRO arbitration process, believing that the limited document and information discovery afforded under the NASD Customer Code is difficult to obtain due to the securities industry having little respect for complying with NASD discovery procedures because they simply do not believe that an arbitration panel will be as likely as a sitting judge to sanction them for their discovery violations and related behaviour 82 .
Cost and Complexity
Observers have noted that the NASD Code of Arbitration no longer reflects a simple, efficient medium for the economical resolution of securities disputes. Instead it exhibits the characteristics of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but without the procedural safeguards of full discovery, fair award of costs to the prevailing party, explanatory orders, a sitting judge, and appellate review. 83 The practice of securities arbitration is more contentious than in previous times, arguably due to the lack of judicial oversight. Given the substantial filing fees, pre-hearing and hearing costs levied by the NASD -from a pure cost of recovery perspective -litigation has become a relative bargain. 84 It is not atypical for a four-day arbitration evidentiary hearing, coupled with the costs of pre-hearing conferences, to produce fees and expense billings from the NASD totalling substantially in excess of US$10,000.
Factoring in the tendency of arbitration panels to 'split the baby', whether it relates to 81 Little, 'Fairness is in the eyes of the beholder'. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 
Lessons Learnt
Congress requested the United States General Accountability Office ('GAO') to evaluate SRO arbitration relating to concerns held by Congress, state regulators, and investor groups 'about whether industry-sponsored arbitration is fair to investors', with a primary concern that 'arbitration at an industry-sponsored forum may have a pro-industry bias'. The GAO issued an initial study in 1992 (the 1992 GAO Report)
finding that there existed no industry bias at industry sponsored forums versus independent forums, but made no finding regarding the overall 'fairness' of the arbitration process due to the limited number of customer disputes being litigated and the inherent differences between the litigation and arbitration processes. The 1992 GAO Report did find that, at the time, the SROs lacked internal controls sufficient to reasonably assure that SRO arbitrators were either independent or competent. In particular, the 1992 GAO Report found that the SROs had no formal standards to .
Investor Perception
Empirical evidence shows (1) investors have a far more negative perception of securities arbitration than all other participants, (2) investors have a strong negative perception of the bias of arbitrators in the securities arbitration forum, and (3) investors lack knowledge of the securities arbitration process 55.48 per cent of the customers who responded either agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition that they would be more satisfied if they had an explanation of the award.
51.55 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that they would recommend to others that they use arbitration to resolve their securities disputes.
62.62 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that they, as a whole, feel that the arbitration process was fair.
49.2 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that arbitration was without bias for all parties.
-60 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that they have a favourable view of securities for customer disputes.
-61.3 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that arbitration was fair for all parties.
However, it has been argued that changes to investor perception of the fairness of the FINRA arbitral process may have been caused by the market itself, and the fact that in a period of market instability, more awards and damages are likely to go in favour of investors than in a period of stability -ironically, what is likely is that in light of the 2008 Market Crash, investors will receive larger and more frequent awards. Therefore, it is likely that in a follow up survey inquiring about the securities arbitration Forum, an investor survey will likely find that the users of the Forum believe the present form of the Forum is fair. There is a long-held view by many practitioners that arbitrators, after finding the brokerage firm liable to the investor, are prone to 'split the baby' when deciding the amount of compensatory damages to be paid by the securities industry in an effort to placate the industry arbitrator, and to increase the likelihood that industry respondents will not strike arbitrators (public or industry) from serving on future arbitration panels. Moreover, there is the view that arbitration panels judge the securities industry's major broker-dealers with greater leniency than their smaller broker-dealer brethren. These perceptions find a statistical foundation by a study In the context of the perceptions of bias in the arbitral process, it has been argued that the inability of investors to effectively enforce property rights through a more efficient mechanism, whether it be through litigation, arbitration, binding 93 Little, 'Fairness is in the eyes of the beholder'. 94 Ibid. mediation through a neutral third party, or an administrative law judge, leads to market inefficiency, which is detrimental to the health of an economic system. In the short run, market inefficiencies benefit only those few who encourage them while in the long run they are harmful to the overall economy. 97 Often it is the small investor bringing his claim in a court of law or arbitral institution that serves as the early warning system of wide-spread wrong-doing. Increased transparency, sensible regulation, and the ability of the individual investor to enforce his or her property rights in a court of law are important components of any solution to preventing future economic instability. 
Study Results
In order to assess how arbitrators and ombudsmen view the benefits, practices. This finding requires further elaboration as will be examined below. Second, the study examined the effect of the method of practice on general settlement rate. Again, no statistically significant variation could be found between the two methods and their effect on settlement. In general, the large majority of settlement rates resulting from arbitration and ombuds processes are greater than 50%. That being said, the results indicate a slightly higher overall settlement rate through use of the ombuds process. These findings will be examined more fully on the basis of the results of open-ended survey data below. Finally, the study examined relative user satisfaction by method of practice.
Again, no statistically significant variation could be found between the two methods.
A slightly higher level of perceived satisfaction was reported for arbitration practice, though this might be largely explained by sample selection bias, given that arbitration practitioners are asked to self-report perceived user satisfaction with the process. In examining the results of the survey regarding the rate of settlement in a multi-tiered ombuds process, over 87 per cent of respondents observed that settlement occurred in 40-100 per cent of cases. This appears to be a positive rate of settlement and provides an indication of the overall effectiveness of the process.
Areas for Improvement
At the same time, those surveyed identified a number of areas in which the ombuds processes could be improved in resolving consumer financial disputes. These While a number of areas exist for continued improvement in the delivery of consumer financial arbitration services, overall, the large majority of practitioners (78 per cent) perceived that claimants were satisfied overall with the process.
Suggestions for Improving Overall Efficacy of the Arbitration Process in
Consumer Financial Disputes
Arbitration practitioners were also asked about what suggestions they have for improving the overall efficacy of the process. Suggestions included the need for parties to include arbitration provisions in their contracts and the utility of hiring
Conclusion
Given the small size of the study (n=49), caution must be given to overgeneralization and extrapolating beyond the sample group. Further research will be required to extend these findings and offer more comprehensive conclusions. In the immediate term, however, consideration may be given to exploring possible applications of ombuds processes in the context of consumer financial dispute resolution in the United States.
Largely reflecting many of the benefits as well as some of the challenges facing consumer financial arbitration, the use of arbitration in resolving consumer financial disputes has expanded at a moderate rate. Recent legislation in the United
States for example, has sought to limit the obligation to submit to some mandatory consumer credit card arbitration schemes. Overall, the benefits of ombuds processprincipally, the provision of an independent and free review service for financial customers, coupled with an internal check on the system in the form of decisions rendered without prejudice on the claimant, provide important safeguards against abuse. At the same time the service also helps to identify areas of improvement and reform for banks. 149 Perhaps as a result of such benefits, the use of ombuds processes has been increasing in recent years. The majority of respondents indicated that they had in fact seen an increase in the use of ombuds processes in consumer financial dispute resolution in recent years. At the same time, practitioners acknowledged areas for continued improvement including the need for greater public education, 150 oversight and quality assurance of ombuds processes.
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